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CONTRACTING OUT TEMPORARY 





Since 2003 the German Public Employment Service (PES) has been experimenting with the 
contracting out of various services. One of the new labour market programmes is the 
Personnel Service Agencies, which provide client firms with jobseekers on a temporary 
assignment basis and are responsible for integrating jobseekers into non-subsidised 
employment. By contracting out employment services, the PES seeks to exploit efficiency 
gains characteristic of enterprises that compete in quasi-markets. In order to integrate 
jobseekers as rapidly as possible, a result-oriented system of incentives has been developed. 
This paper describes the institutional setting and examines its appropriateness for efficient job 
placement services. 
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Contracting Out Temporary Help Services in Germany 
1 Introduction 
In the wake of the general trend towards privatisation and deregulation in the last few 
years, Public Employment Services (PES) have been contracted out in various OECD 
countries. In 1998, Australia replaced its PES with a private “Job Network” of approxi-
mately 200 firms. Placement contracts are awarded to these companies in a tendering 
procedure. Performance is remunerated with state premiums based on placements 
(Lundsgaard 2002, OECD 2001, Struyven and Steurs 2005). In 2000, the Netherlands 
followed Australia’s example (de Koning 2004, Struyven and Steurs 2005). In the same 
year, the British government also began to commission private service providers with 
the integration of hard-to-place jobseekers (Hales et al. 2003, Hasluck et al. 2003). One 
of the most important innovations in Danish employment policy since 2003 is the in-
volvement of so-called “other actors”. What is new in the involvement of “other actors” 
in employment services is the fact that all previous “central” restrictions as to the dura-
tion, scope, target groups, average prices and types of activities of the “other actors” 
have been abandoned (Bredgaard et al. 2005). 
The ongoing criticism of the efficiency of the PES is one of the reasons why Germany 
has recently started to experiment with the contracting out of employment services. The 
contracting out approach contrasts sharply with the way employment services have tra-
ditionally been handled in Germany. Under traditional procurement, the PES specifies 
the inputs and retains control rights over how the service is delivered. With the new 
approach the PES specifies the output, that is to say, it specifies the basic service stan-
dard, but it is the firm that decides on how to deliver the service. But in contrast to Aus-
tralia and the Netherlands, which serve as prototypes for the application of the principle 
of market competition in the placement and reintegration of jobseekers (Struyven and 
Steurs 2005, OECD 2005), Germany’s goal is not the privatisation of the PES. On the 
contrary, one seeks for alternative ways of integrating the unemployed in the labour 
market. In Germany, starting in 1994, temporary help services (THS) have been used 
for the first time as an instrument of active labour market policy. The pilot project set up 
with start-up financing came to an end in 1996. The goal of the programme was to fa-
cilitate the reintegration of hard-to-place jobseekers into regular employment by assign-
ing them to client firms temporarily. Among the programme participants were long-term 
unemployed, those returning to the labour market after a longer absence, older people, 
handicapped unemployed and drug addicts. In the context of this programme, firms en-
gaged in the provision of THS were given loans subject to repayment as well as subsi-
dies (Vanselow and Weinkopf 2000). Microeconometric evaluation confirms the suc-3 
 
cess of the programme. Participants showed an integration rate that was 13 percent 
higher than that of the control group (Almus et al. 1999, Jahn 2002). 
The idea of using THS as an instrument of active labour market policy was taken up 
once again by the Hartz-Commission in 2002. The Hartz Commission, which was set up 
by the federal government, established so-called Personnel-Service-Agencies (PSA). 
According to Art. 37c of the Social Security Code, Third Book (SGB III), all of the 180 
local employment offices are required to set up at least one PSA. The goal of the PSA is 
to integrate unemployed people who are not too difficult to place as quickly as possible 
in the labour market by assigning them temporarily to client firms; a further objective is 
to reduce unemployment duration. Apart from the temporary assignment, training, in-
tensive individual counselling and close contact between the PSA and the client firms 
are other factors that ought to improve the reintegration chances of the programme par-
ticipants.  
PSA contracts were to be given with priority to commercial enterprises. Public-private-
partnerships or the local employment offices themselves could only run PSA if it had 
proved to be impossible to find a suitable private provider. In this sense the PES has 
contracted out the former public sector function to market competition. The political 
responsibility, however, continues to be borne by the PES, which defines the institu-
tional design. In order to ensure that only efficient enterprises engage in assigning and 
placing unemployed persons, the PSA are chosen in a public tendering process. The 
goal of the tendering procedure was to introduce ex ante competition (Domberger and 
Jensen 1997). Thus conditions were created which are typical for a quasi-market (Bart-
lett and Le Grand 1993).  
By means of contracting out labour-market services, the PES seeks to take advantage of 
the efficiency gains which arise when services are offered in a competitive environment. 
These advantages are in particular good-quality services at the lowest possible costs, the 
know-how of private providers with respect to assignment and placement of employees, 
and their knowledge of regional labour markets. But it is by no means certain that the 
PSA will pursue the social objectives laid down by the PES. Conflicts can arise on the 
one hand if the PES seeks to give priority to finding employment for difficult-to-place 
jobseekers; the PSA will, on the other hand, prefer easy-to-place jobseekers with better 
qualifications to maximize their returns; there is a risk that they will engage in “cream-
ing” or “cherry picking”. Another kind of conflict could arise if the PSA are made to 
bear disproportionately the risks involved in the temporary assignment of unemployed. 
In this case there will not be a strong motivation to engage in labour market services. 
Conflicts may also arise from the fact that the PSA are less interested in the placement 4 
 
of unemployed, and more in their temporary assignment. Finally, if the relationship be-
tween the contract parties is characterised by information asymmetries, then there will 
be a risk that the PSA will behave opportunistically. The PSA may be tempted to pro-
vide less services or a lower quality than they are contractually required to provide, in 
order to reduce costs. In order to avoid opportunistic behaviour of this sort, in Germany 
a system of result-oriented incentives has been put in place, which closely relates de-
clining subsidies to the results produced. This system of regulation and incentives is 
very likely unique in the world.
1  
The aim of our paper is to describe the institutional framework within which the PSA 
operate and to analyse whether this setting is suited to integrate unemployed as quickly 
as possible into regular employment. Because PSA are just being put into place it is not 
feasible to make a final assessment of their achievements. Therefore our attention here 
is focused on a preliminary empirical assessment of the extent to which the conditions 
of quasi-markets appear to be fulfilled. Section 2 describes the quasi-market in which 
the PSA operate; this section also defines the criteria for evaluating the efficiency with 
which services are provided. In section 3, the tendering procedure is described and 
evaluated. Section 4 examines the referral system for the selection of unemployed per-
sons. Sections 5 and 6 analyse whether the financial incentives are suitable to provide 
the PSA with sufficient motivation to assign unemployed people to jobs and in this way 
to integrate them quickly into the labour market. Section 7 provides a summary and 
conclusions. 
2  The quasi-market for PSA services  
In contracting out PSA, the PES seeks to take advantage of the efficiency gains that 
arise when enterprises are exposed to competition. As Domberger and Jensen (1997, 68) 
point out, a distinctive feature of contracting out is the element of ex ante competition. 
This means a competition for the market through competitive tendering as opposed to 
competition in it. As mentioned above the tendering procedure for PSA is primarily 
restricted to outside providers and is a precondition for access to the market. By this 
means conditions are created which are typical for a quasi-market. Le Grand (2001, 3) 
defines a quasi-market as a “market where independent agents compete with one an-
other for custom from purchasers, but where, unlike in a normal market, purchasing 
power comes not directly from consumers but from the state”. Quasi-markets differ 
from conventional markets in a number of ways (Le Grand and Bartlett, 1993, 10): (1) 
                                                 
1   Experience with THS as an instrument of active labour market policy was first made in the Nether-
lands and Sweden. However, both of these pilot projects were broken off after a very short period. 5 
 
They are “quasi” because service providers do not necessarily aim at maximizing prof-
its, nor are they necessarily privately owned. (2) The purchasing power of the final con-
sumers is not expressed in monetary terms; instead it is centralized in a single purchas-
ing agency which chooses the service provider. (3) The final consumers are represented 
in the market by the purchasing agency instead of acting on their own account.  
The quasi-market in which the PSA operate (figure 1) shows the following characteris-
tics: based on a public tendering procedure the local employment offices choose the 
potential PSA. Private owned enterprises, among them temporary work agencies 
(TWA), educational institutions and professional placement agencies, engage in an ex 
ante competition for the award of a concession. Contrary to the assertion of Le Grand 
and Bartlett (1993), the PSA are primarily interested in maximising their returns. Al-
though PSA can operate in the framework of a Public-Private-Partnership or may be 
operated by a local employment office, these organisational forms have not been real-
ised in Germany.  























The demand for the services of the PSA comes from the PES; the unemployed have in 
this respect no purchasing power and do not appear as direct demanders for the assign-
ment or placement services of the PSA. The PES designates registered jobseekers that 
are considered as suitable for temporary assignment or placement and refers them to the 
PSA; the jobseekers can not choose between different providers. Every two years, the 
PES decides on the number and the extent of the PSA contracts. The contract parties 
specify the target group, the expected integration rate and the training to be undertaken 6 
 
during periods without assignment. The providers receive declining subsidies from the 
PES, which are related to the period of employment within the PSA. These subsidies are 
made up of two components: the base subsidy and the placement premium, which are 
described in more detail in section 5. 
The task of the PSA is to find temporary assignments at user firms for unemployed and 
to place them in regular employment. In contrast to professional placement services, 
which concentrate on the placement of unemployed and receive in return placement 
premiums, the PSA obtain additional revenue through their assignment activity. In this 
activity they compete with commercial TWA. The PSA are thus confronted with an ex 
ante competition in the tendering procedure and by on-going competition for potential 
client firms.  
According to the theoretical framework of Bartlett and Le Grand (1993, 19ff.) quasi-
markets can only function efficiently if the following five requirements are met:  
Market Structure: The market structure has to be competitive. There should be many 
providers and many purchasers, each of them unable to influence the aggregate output 
or the price, respectively. Both, market entry and exit have to be relatively costless and 
otherwise unimpeded. Non-competitive providers should be driven out of the market by 
bankruptcy. Finally, prices should react to changes in demand and supply and should act 
as signals for the efficient allocation of resources. These theoretical conditions are only 
partially fulfilled in the quasi-market in which the PSA operate. The PES has decentral-
ised the tendering procedure so that each local employment office can decide independ-
ently on the number of vacancies per contract and the number of (block) contracts to be 
advertised. In the regional labour market, the local employment office can act as a mo-
nopolist and decides on the access to the market for a limited period. The tendering pro-
cedure is broken down into three stages in which the employment offices select the most 
suitable bidders. Firms that have been turned down in the tendering procedure have only 
a new chance to engage in the service in a following up tender (see section 3). As we 
shall see in section 5, the pricing mechanism operates through a formula administered 
by the purchasing agency. Thus the prices are not formed by the interplay of demand 
and supply, but rather are negotiated prices. 
Creaming: A second requirement of the theory of quasi-markets is that creaming among 
the jobseekers should be avoided. Bartlett and Le Grand (1993, 32) define creaming as 
discrimination against more expensive users. Creaming is seen when the local employ-
ment office refers to the PSA easy-to-place jobseekers, or when the PSA hire such peo-
ple preferentially. In distinction to a conventional market, in the quasi-market, the local 7 
 
employment office as purchasing agency, and the PSA as service providers determine 
which jobseekers get a PSA job. Both parties can have an interest in focussing their ac-
tivity on jobseekers that are relatively easy to assign or place: the purchasing agency has 
this interest since it wants to be able to show to the Federal PES that the instrument has 
been used successful; the service provider seeks to reduce costs or maximise profits. But 
only a failure to adjust the financial incentives according to the target groups will create 
an incentive for the PSA to engage in creaming. If contracts are tendered with a fixed 
number of PSA vacancies, then it will only be possible to prevent creaming by formu-
lating clearly defined target groups which can serve as orientation in the process for 
referring jobseekers to the programme (see section 4). 
Motivation: The third condition focuses on the motivation of the purchasing agency and 
the service provider. The purchasing agency must respond to the wants and needs of the 
unemployed and increase the choices open for their clients. The service providers 
should pursue economic objectives, i.e. they should primarily seek to maximise profits. 
If PES are privatised, it will take time for their personnel, which were accustomed to the 
conditions prevailing in public service, to adjust to the new conditions. Such problems 
of transition are not present, since potential PSA are all profit oriented and accustomed 
to working in a market environment. The PSA employ the jobseekers which are referred 
by the PES and assume all the obligations of an employer: remuneration, continued pay-
ment of wages in the event of illness and vacation payments. The PSA has also to bear 
theses fixed costs during periods without assignment. Hence, if they are to cover these 
fixed costs, they must assign their employees to client firms. A risk adverse PSA will be 
reluctant to conclude a contract with the PES unless the latter is prepared to assume a 
part of the risk sufficient to make the contract attractive to the PSA. Otherwise the PSA 
will simply abstain from participation in the tendering procedure (see section 5). 
Information: A fourth condition for quasi-markets to operate efficiently is that the pur-
chasing agency as well as the service provider should have access to accurate informa-
tion at low cost, particularly information bearing on the cost and the quality of the ser-
vice and the characteristics of the unemployed. Information asymmetries together with 
interest conflicts between the parties give rise to incentives that encourage opportunistic 
behaviour.  
Amongst the various types of information asymmetries that are found in the principal-
agent theory, the literature on contracting out emphasises the problems arising from 
information asymmetries subsequent to the conclusion of a contract (e.g. Sappington 
1991). There are two kinds of information asymmetries which arise between the pur-
chasing agencies as principals and the service providers as agents: The agent’s activities 8 
 
may not be observed by the principal (hidden action) or the agent may have information 
unavailable to the principal (hidden information) (Arrow 1985). Monitoring the agent 
and obtaining information both involve high costs for the principal. This is why infor-
mation asymmetries give the agent space for discretionary action which he or she can 
use to maximise profits. If the financial incentives of the quasi-market are not compati-
ble with the integration goals of the PES, the Federal Agency is unable to obtain its 
goal. The reason that information asymmetries can emerge is that the characteristics of 
the service are both difficult to specify prior to service delivery and difficult to identify. 
The same problem exists with respect to the abilities and the motivation of the job-
seekers referred by the local employment offices, because it is scarcely possible to lay 
down their characteristics contractually. But this information is necessary for the pro-
viders to price their service appropriately.  
A second source of asymmetry is related to the fact that the principal is unable to deter-
mine whether the integration obtained is due to the efforts of the PSA or whether it is 
simply the result of chance, perhaps abetted by a prior creaming process. Therefore in-
formation asymmetries may encourage opportunistic behaviour. It occurs where provid-
ers put in fewer resources into the provision of the service than is consistent with the 
terms of the contract. In our case, an example of this would be if the PSA is not provid-
ing any training or assisted placement activities to their employees in periods without 
assignment.  
Opportunistic behaviour can be avoided if the purchaser puts in place a perfect monitor-
ing system, which, however, entails considerable transaction costs. In order to reduce 
monitoring costs, the PES has developed a system of regulation and financial incentives 
which is partly based on the integration results obtained. Apart from the integration in 
the labour market, the integration speed serves as well as a measure of success. PSA 
which do not achieve adequate placement results run the risk of not having their fixed-
term contracts renewed. Furthermore, low integration rates have financial consequences, 
since the placement premiums are paid depending on success (see section 6).  
Transaction Costs: Relational contracts involving complex services are a typical feature 
of quasi-markets. In such contracts it is often very costly, or even impossible, to specify 
all future contingencies, and all possible adaptations to unforeseen circumstances. 
Therefore the contracts are incomplete. At the same time, the extent of the demand for 
services is ex ante uncertain. This is particularly the case when a new instrument of ac-
tive labour market policy is under development. For these reasons, contract negotiations 
give rise to high transaction costs. On the one hand there are the costs of tendering and 
of drawing up, negotiating and securing contracts („ex ante” transaction costs). On the 9 
 
other hand, there are the costs of monitoring the outcomes of contracts (“ex post” trans-
action costs) (Williamson 1985). Establishing a quasi-market is only successful if the 
improvements in efficiency are higher than the increase in transaction costs (Bartlett and 
Le Grand 1993, 26 ff.). To reduce the ex ante transaction costs the tendering procedure 
involves three stages. This implies a saving for both the commissioning body and the 
potential providers as is described in the next section. Moreover, because contracts are 
not taken out for each individual client but for groups (block contracts), time and effort 
spent in negotiation and therefore transaction costs are reduced (Jahn and Windsheimer 
2004a, 3). 
3  The tendering procedure 
A contract is awarded to the PSA after a public tendering procedure. The goal of this ex 
ante competition is to ensure that only those firms operate as a PSA whose qualifica-
tions meet the standards set by the PES. The tendering procedure involves three stages. 
The pre-selection of agencies begins with a public invitation to tender by the local em-
ployment office. The bidding documents lay down the terms and conditions of the PSA 
contract. Among other things, the number and the characteristics of the jobseekers that 
are to be referred to the PSA are set out. The goal is to make it easier for interested 
firms to decide to participate and to facilitate bidders’ cost calculations. Based on the 
description in the call to submit tenders, interested parties may announce their interest to 
participate in the competition. They must prove their reliability. Furthermore, they must 
also show evidence of their experience as a commercial or non-profit TWA, a profes-
sional placing agency, or some other former involvement in active labour market poli-
cies. Having carried out successfully such an activity in the last twelve months is suffi-
cient proof. Finally, they must provide evidence of their capability. In general, this re-
quirement is fulfilled if a tendering firm can show commercial experience, which pro-
vides a basis for supposing that the organisational ability will permit the firm to operate 
successfully as a PSA. From the list of applicants the local employment office selects 
suitable candidates, who are then given the opportunity to submit a bid. 
In the second stage the bidder must specify a price. The amount of base subsidies and 
placement premiums which the PSA can expect to receive will depend on this price (see 
section 5). Furthermore, the tender must provide a detailed proposal on how the PSA 
will be run. The concept must include details concerning the personnel and structure of 
the planned PSA, the collective agreement to be used, the strategy for acquiring com-
missions from client firms, the expected extent of assignment periods and training ac-
tivities foreseen during periods in which employees are without assignment, as well as 10 
 
the achievable integration rate, which can be used as a measure of success when the 
local employment office will come to decide on the renewal of the contract. The bids 
are ranked according to the price and quality. Price and quality of the offers are evalu-
ated together. Between April 2003 and April 2004, the tender price was given a weight 
of 60 percent, the quality of the offer based on the PSA concept 40 percent. The bank-
ruptcy of the largest PSA-firm with 10,000 PSA-employees in February 2004, has made 
it advisable to place more weight on the quality of the bids. Now, the tender price is 
given a weight of 40 percent and the quality of the offer 60 percent. The PSA concept is 
evaluated on a scale between one and ten, with a variety of criteria being used. The 
score emerges from the evaluation of the concept presented. Nevertheless the grading of 
the quality of the PSA concept is based on the subjective assessments of the responsible 
employees in the local employment office. Thus the bidders do not know in detail what 
standards are used to evaluate the individual parts of their PSA concept.  
In a third stage, after the evaluation has been completed, the local employment office 
enters into negotiations with up to five bidders who have submitted the most economi-
cal offers. Finally a fixed-term contract, which is usually limited to 24 months, is signed 
with one of the bidding companies. An extension for further 24 months is possible. 
This tendering procedure has advantages and disadvantages. First, the decentralised 
tendering procedure makes it possible for the local employment office to determine the 
number of contracts and vacancies according to conditions in the regional labour mar-
ket. This makes the task of keeping in touch with the needs of the unemployed easier. 
On the other hand, the relationship between both sides will be too intimate, so it will be 
difficult to maintain the distance that a market process requires. This is all the more the 
case since many local employment offices have been cooperating for quite some time 
with the tendering firms. Second, a restricted invitation to tender increases the success 
chances of the bidders so that they take greater care in preparing their bids, which in 
turn increases the quality. Furthermore, restricted tendering involves cost savings for the 
firms as well as for the local employment offices, as they have fewer bids to prepare or 
assess, respectively. On the other hand, by setting up a qualifying competition in ad-
vance, the number of bids and thus the variety of bids is restricted. The renewal option 
means that newcomers have only a reduced chance of participating. 
In the tendering procedure, only those competitors which have already provided suc-
cessfully services in close proximity to the market will be given a contract. In this way, 
the PES ensures that tendering firms are really able to fulfil their contractual obliga-
tions. Then too, in the course of the tendering procedure, the potential PSA has docu-
mented the services that it proposes to provide.  11 
 
Apart from the choice of suitable enterprises, a further task of the public tendering pro-
cedure is to determine the amount of subsidies that the PSA should receive. The subsi-
dies have to respond to four requirements: in the first place they must ensure that the 
PSA do not suffer losses so that they have an incentive to take part in the tendering pro-
cedure. Second, the subsidies have got to be sufficient to cover the periods when an 
employee is not on assignment and be sufficient to finance the training which is re-
quired for those times. Third, the subsidy must allow a reduction of the assignment fees 
in order to increase demand for employees who are difficult to place. And finally, the 
subsidies must satisfy the “principle of cost-effectiveness” of the public sector. Crowd-
ing out effects and deadweight losses should be avoided. Quantifying the subsidies that 
just fulfil these conditions represents a very difficult, indeed scarcely solvable, problem 
for the local employment offices. In contrast to the PSA, employment offices have only 
partial knowledge of the market for THS; hence they have difficulty in estimating the 
receipts of the PSA on this head. One of the functions of the tendering procedure is to 
determine what the marginal costs are, which makes it possible to infer the “efficient” 
level of subsidies under competitive conditions.  
4 Recruiting  the  unemployed without creaming? 
The success of the contracting out is multi-dimensional. Dimensions are the choice of 
the most productive PSA, the number of PSA-jobs created, the integration rate and, fi-
nally, the avoidance of creaming. Up to the end of March 2004, the Federal PES in-
structed the local employment offices to create at least one PSA job for a hundred un-
employed persons. The number of vacancies per contract and the target groups could be 
decided by the local employment office itself taking into account the situation prevail-
ing in the regional labour market. Since April 2004, the local employment offices can 
fix the number of PSA contracts and the number of jobs in each contract at their discre-
tion, subject to their budget constraints. The law does, however, lay down that each lo-
cal employment office must have at least one PSA under contract. By February 2005, 
1,235 PSA contracts had been concluded; of these 414 contracts were no longer in 
force, so that at that time 821 PSA contracts were still in force. A PSA provides on an 
average for 43 vacancies (figure 2). Nearly a half of the PSA contracts provide for be-
tween 40 and 60 vacancies. Contracts with less than 20 vacancies make up only 2.5 per-
cent of all contracts; such contracts are typically concluded for target groups which are 
difficult to place. Contracts providing for 60 vacancies are concluded for long-term un-
employed and for low-skilled unemployed that are considered easy to place. The PSA 
offers the jobseekers a fixed-term contract for nine to twelve months. During this period 
the PSA assume all the contractual obligations of an employer. The employer can dis-12 
 
miss the employee at any time during the probation period of six month, afterwards with 
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Figure 2: PSA contracts by number of vacancies, February 2005
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in %
Source: Bundesagentur für Arbeit, own calculations.
 
 
Up to April 2004, the PSA had to fill their vacancies within three months. As figure 3 
shows, only a few PSA were able to meet this requirement. In October 2003, just 60 
percent of the vacancies had been filled. The reason for this is that PSA initially seek to 
acquire requests for workers from client firms before they accept referrals of unem-
ployed. In reaction to this, the PES has changed the terms. Since April 2004, the PSA 
are contractually obliged to fill 25 percent of the vacancies during the first month, and 
this mark applies to the following months as well. After four months, the contractually 
agreed number of vacancies must be filled, or at a minimum 90 percent of them (Jahn 
2004, 5). Figure 3 shows that despite this requirement, the share of filled vacancies 
comes to about 75 percent: it has not as yet proved to be possible to enforce full compli-
ance with the conditions of the contracts in this respect. The reason is that the PES has 
scarcely any sanctions that it can impose for non-compliance. Although it can terminate 
a contract with a notice period of three month, the local employment offices have been 
reluctant to apply this drastic measure. One reason for this reluctance is that a new ten-
der is costly; another reason is that there is an element of legal uncertainty if a fixed-
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Figure 3: Stock, inflow and share of filled vacancies
Source: Bundesagentur für Arbeit, own calculations.





Figure 3 shows that the largest inflow into the PSA were registered in August 2003 
(9,600 entries) and in September 2003 (8,400 entries). There are good reasons for sup-
posing that the introductory phase was essentially completed by October 2003. Up to 
February 2004, the stock of PSA-employees climbed steadily, reaching a peak of 33,000 
in that month. In that month the largest provider, with 200 contracts and 10,000 vacan-
cies became insolvent and as a result there was a marked dip in the number of PSA-
workers. By the following month, March 2004, they were down to 27,000. As a reaction 
to the rather modest reintegration rates (see section 6), many contracts that had termi-
nated were not renewed, so that in February 2005 only 25,700 formerly unemployed 
were still employed by PSA. 
If providers and local employment offices concentrate on those jobseekers that are easi-
est to place or to assign to a user firm, then creaming is taking place. This occurs if the 
contracts do not define the target groups unambiguously. The preferred target group of 
the PES are jobseekers who cannot be quickly placed by the PES, but who have only 
low level impediments to placement and thus are potentially employable and suitable 
for temporary assignment. Furthermore, they have to be eligible to receive unemploy-
ment benefits. The target group includes young people, jobseekers without vocational 
qualification, long-term unemployed, and unemployed who represent a risk of becoming 
long-term unemployed, unemployed with health problems and older people. In the ten-
dering procedure, the local employment office specifies the target groups with respect to 
occupational and personal characteristics; such a specification might be in terms of 
young people under 25 with vocational training in a technical area. The local employ-14 
 
ment offices tend to define target groups that are as homogenous as possible (Sinus 
2003). 
The local employment offices make a first selection of the unemployed they want to 
refer to the PSA. The PSA, however, can refuse to accept a jobseeker. It is obvious that 
the PSA prefer unemployed for whom it is easy to find a temporary assignment or are 
easy to place. Thus the selection process is subject to the control of the service provider. 
Furthermore, the PSA prefer heterogeneous target groups. They argue that broadly de-
fined groups make it easier to respond to the needs of their clients. However, there are 
objections to acceding to this wish (Jahn 2004). First of all, there is no compelling rea-
son why PSA ought to restrict their effort to unemployed that have been referred by the 
PES; there is no reason why they should not attend to specific demands for temporary 
agency workers (TAW) by recruiting employees in the regular labour market. The in-
tention behind establishing PSA was not to subsidise the entire market for THS. Second, 
it should be taken into account that in defining heterogeneous target groups one is mak-
ing it easier for the PSA to engage in cherry picking (Ochel 2004). Especially large 
TWA, when they are operating as a PSA, apply the same standards when deciding 
whether or not to accept the unemployed selected by the PES as they do when they re-
cruit a TAW in the free market.  
In order to prevent creaming, the local employment offices have to ensure that they only 
refer jobseekers which belong to the target groups defined in the contract. Experience in 
Germany shows that PSA are able to enforce their ideas with respect to the personnel 
structure of the PSA-employees. In interviews carried out between June 2003 and Octo-
ber 2004, the local employment offices reported that only 22 percent of the jobseekers 
who had been pre-selected by them were accepted by the PSA. The PSA not only select 
their employees in the context of the referral procedure, but also subsequently, when 
they dismiss their employees. 31.6 percent of employees leaving the PSA between June 
2003 and February 2005 were dismissed for misbehaviour or economic reasons. 
A further indication that creaming is taking place can be derived from a comparison of 
the socio-economic characteristics of PSA-employees as compared to employees work-
ing for TWA.
2 Table 1 shows that the employees in PSA differ very little from TAW. 
Older employees (those 50 years or older) have less chance to be employed by a PSA 
than by a TWA (9 percent versus 11 percent). Furthermore, participants in the PSA pro-
gramme are more likely to have had vocational training then their counterparts in TWA 
                                                 
2   In comparing the socio-economic characteristics of PSA-employees with non-subsidised TAW one 
must bear in mind that the data are taken from different statistical sources. In particular, the indices re-
ferring to vocational training and length of unemployment are defined differently.  15 
 
(61 percent versus 53 percent). Only 27 percent of PSA-employees were without voca-
tional training; for the TAW the figure was 30 percent. And finally, only 29 percent of 
PSA-employees had been previously unemployed for between six and twelve months; 
only 14 percent were classified as long-term unemployed. Thus long-term unemployed 
persons had scarcely a better chance of finding employment in the PSA programme than 
in a non-subsidised TWA (this question is dealt with in more detail in Jahn and Wind-
sheimer 2004b). Women, however, are more likely to be employed by a PSA than by a 
non-subsidised TWA. Unemployed with health problems (12 percent) are surprisingly 
often found in a PSA. Comparable information for TAW is not available. In interpreting 
table 1 it must be borne in mind that a jobseeker may have more than one obstacle to 
placement: an unemployed person for example may have health problems, lack voca-
tional training and be over 50 years of age. Table 1 sheds no light on whether an accu-
mulation of impediments to placement is found more often amongst PSA-employees 
than amongst TAW. 




Gender (female)  33.3 27.2 
Job seeker with health problems  11.7 n.a. 
Age in years 
< 20 
20 - 24 
25 - 34 














Vocational training (VT) 
Without VT 
With VT (outside firm) 















Unemployment duration in months 


















a)  Inflow in PSA, April 2003 to January 2004, Source: Jahn (2004), 
b)  Stock of TAW, age 15-65; Source: BA, Beschäftigtenstatistik, as of  30 June 2004, 
c)  Source: BA, Arbeitnehmerüberlassungsstatistik, as of 30 June 2004, own calculations. 16 
 
5  Financial incentives, balancing of risk and assignment activity 
In order to attain its integration target, the PES must not only choose suitable firms to 
run the PSA and refer suitable jobseekers, but it also subsidises every employee of the 
PSA. The PSA receive a base subsidy for every person hired; for every placement in 
employment subject to social security contributions they receive a placement premium. 
The amount of both of these subsidies depends on the offer price negotiated before the 
contract is concluded; it varies according to target group and the conditions in the re-
gional labour market. Table 2 provides information on the amount of the base subsidy 
and the placement premium in relation to offer prices.  
Table 2:  Amount of base subsidy and placement premium as a % of offer prices 
Employment duration 
in months 
Base subsidy  Placement  
premium 
1 – 3   100  200 
4 – 6   75  150 
7 – 9   50  100 
> 10   0  100 
 Source:  Own  compilation. 
The base subsidy is paid per PSA-employee and per month; the placement premium 
depends on the successful placement of the jobseeker. Since it is better to place a job-
seeker in a sustainable rather than a temporary job, the placement premium is broken 
down into two equal parts. The first instalment is due at the beginning of any period of 
regular employment that is programmed to last at least three months. The second in-
stalment is paid when the PSA can prove that the jobseeker is still employed after six 
month. In the PSA contracts that went into effect up to February 2005, 38 percent of the 
contracts had an offer price of between 1,100 and 1,300 €; in a fourth of the contracts 
the offer price fell between 900 and 1,100 €. 17 percent of the contracts provide for an 
offer price of between 700 and 900 €; in 11 percent, an offer price between 1,300 and 
1,500 € has been agreed upon. The average offer price was 1,084 € (figure 4).  
In paying a base subsidy, the PES covers a part of the risk of the PSA. Their risk arises 
because they hire jobseekers with slight impediments to placement for a period limited 
to nine months. In comparison to non-subsidised TWA, the combination of narrowly 
defined target groups and fixed-term employment gives rise to longer periods in which 
the unemployed persons are not on assignments. The base subsidy is supposed to cover 
not only these costs, but also the costs involved in training and coaching (Jahn and 
Windsheimer 2004a, 3). The idea behind the base subsidy is thus to guarantee unem-17 
 
ployed that they will be employed for at least nine months. Instable employment which 
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Figure 4: Offer price in PSA contracts, February 2005
offer price in Euro
in %
Source: Bundesagentur für Arbeit, own calculations.
 
 
The extent to which the PES subsidies a PSA-employee is examined in table 3. The 
amount of subsidy depends on the employment duration of the PSA-employee. In table 
3, four cases are distinguished: periods of employment of three, six, nine and twelve 
months. These periods have been chosen, since the subsidy formula varies at intervals 
of a quarter year. The estimates are based on an hourly wage of ten €. This corresponds 
to hourly wages in wage group four, including wage supplements in the main collective 
agreement for temporary agency work in 2005. The employer’s share of social security 
contributions comes to 20.6 percent of the gross wage. The personnel costs related to 
placement efforts, coaching and training amount to 25 percent of the gross wage 
(Bertelsmann Stiftung et al. 2002, 30). In addition, it is assumed that the PSA incur 
fixed costs of 600 € when they hire an unemployed person. The calculations are based 
on an offer price of 1,100 €, which corresponds approximately to the average offer 
price. We further assume that every vacancy can be filled as soon as it is created; in 
view of the 5.2 million unemployed that confronted 34,000 PSA vacancies in February 
2005, this assumption seems reasonable. In addition, the calculations take into account 
that between April 2003 and February 2005, more than 81,000 employees have left the 
PSA programme (table 5). Of these, 26,000, or 32 percent have found employment. Ap-
proximately 25 percent of the PSA-employees were placed in a job by a PSA or were 
taken over by a client firm where they were working on temporary assignment. Only in 
such cases are the PSA entitled to a placement premium.  18 
 
Table 3:  Degree of subvention for a PSA-employee per year
 
Employment duration of a  
PSA-employee (months)   
twelve nine  six  three 
Total payments,of which (€)  26,808 27,008 27,408 28,608 
    Gross wages  18,000  18,000  18,000  18,000 
    Social security contributions 3,708  3,708 3,708 3,708 
    Personnel costs  4,500  4,500  4,500  4,500 
    Fixed hiring costs  600  800  1,200  2,400 
Total subsidies ,of which  7,700 10,267 12,375 15,400 
    Base subsidy  7,425   9,900  11,550  13,200 
    PP (with integration rate 25 %)     275  367  825  2,200 
Coverage      
    Not including PP (in %)   28  37  42  46 
    Including PP (in %)   29  38  45  54 
PP: placement premium 
  Source:  Own  calculations. 
The amount of the subsidy depends on both the employment duration in a PSA and the 
probability of reintegration. If the PSA-employees are employed for three months, than 
the PSA can fill a vacancy four times a year and in this case the PSA will receive a 
monthly base subsidy equal to 100 percent of the offer price. If a PSA employs two job-
seekers, each for six months, then the monthly base subsidy will amount to 100 percent 
of the offer price for six months and for a further six months to 75 percent of the offer 
price. Table 3 shows that if a PSA-employee is employed for twelve months, then the 
base subsidy will cover 28 percent of costs; for nine months the coverage is 37 percent; 
with six months, the coverage is 42 percent; and for three months, the base subsidy will 
cover 46 percent of the costs. The PSA can count on these subsidies without having 
successfully integrated a single unemployed person. If the PSA succeeds in placing the 
jobseeker, then they are entitled to a placement premium. Assuming an integration rate 
of 25 percent, the share of costs covered by the base subsidy and the placement pre-
mium comes in the four cases examined to 29, 38, 45 and 54 percent respectively. The 
calculations set forth in table 3 show that the local employment offices of the PES bear 
a part of the PSA’ risk, but that the PSA cannot cover all their costs through subsidies.  
The subsidies allow the PSA to reduce the fees they charge for employees temporary 
assigned to client firms; this increases the attractiveness of these employees. This can be 
seen when one compares the calculation with the fees of a non-subsidised TWA. Such 
firms charge a fee for temporary assignment amounting to approximately two and a half 
times the gross remuneration of their employees. This margin is calculated so as to 19 
 
cover the personnel costs incurred when the employees are not on temporary assign-
ment, which arise owing to illness, annual leave, and lack of commissions. This down-
time typically amounts to approximately 25 percent of the regular working year (Kvas-
nicka 2004, 20).
3 With time on assignment amounting to 75 percent, and an average 
duration of employment (in a TWA or a PSA) of three months, a TWA will have a 
yearly profit per employee of 5,142 €. For a PSA receiving subsidies, the profit will 
work out to 20,542 € yearly. Assuming constant time on assignment, the PSA could 
reduce its assignment fee to 13.60 € an hour, before its profits would fall below that of a 
TWA (table 4).  
In February 2005, the average duration of assignment of PSA-employees was 49 per-
cent of the working schedule. This low share as compared to assignments of traditional 
TWA was the result of the requirement to fill their posts quickly, even when there is no 
prospect of assignment for new employees. Another factor is that the PSA are required 
to train their employees when they are not on assignment. Traditional TWA, on the 
other hand, can synchronise new hirings with the beginning of new assignments. Never-
theless, there are grounds for supposing that the PSA could increase assignments by 
reducing their fees. The bottom line of table 4 shows that assuming constant time on 
assignment, the PSA could reduce their fees to 14.98 € without fear of incurring losses. 
Lower assignment fees can be justified with human capital arguments. Productivity 
deficits are often attributed to persons participating in active labour market pro-
grammes; their performance is thought to be below average, or it is thought that they 
present themselves badly or that they have occupational qualifications for which there is 
little market demand (Jahn and Windsheimer 2004b, 5). As a result, unemployed job-
seekers have difficulty finding employment at the prevailing wage rate. Only if the fees 
of the PSA are below the prevailing market price, are user firms willing to accept such 
people for temporary assignment. But very few PSA differentiate in their pricing be-
tween PSA-employees and their traditional employees hired on the open market. The 
scarce practice of demanding lower fees for the PSA-employees has been vehemently 
criticised by the trade unions, which consider this as a form of wage dumping. The re-
luctance to scale down the fees may be due to the fact that many PSA are run by tradi-
tional TWA. If the PSA gives a rebate for PSA-employees, although their productivity 
is comparable to that of the TWA’s other employees, then there is a risk that the fees 
charged for the TWA’s non-subsidised employees will be subject to downward pres-
                                                 
3  There is no systematic information about downtime in TWA. However, the case study conducted by 
Kvasnicka (2004) provides information on this problem. If one adds the working days in which the 
employees were not out on assignment to the days worked, the days on paid leave, including sick 
leave, then one has the share of days when the employees were being paid, but were not on assign-
ment.  20 
 
sure. And finally, the reason for this reluctance could also lie in an unwillingness on the 
part of the PSA to pass on the subsidy to its clients. Assuming that the PSA-employee is 
on assignment 49 percent of the time, and assuming a fee for temporary assignment of 
25 €, the profits of the PSA per employee will amount to 8,842 € yearly (table 4). 


















Profit or loss 
a) 
% €  €  €  €  € 
75 25.00  33,750  28,608  0  5,142 
75  25.00  33,750 28,608 15,400  20,542 
75  13.60  18,350 28,608 15,400  5,142 
49 25.00  22,050  28,608  0  -6,558 
49 25.00  22,050  28,608  15,400  8,842 
49 14.98  13,208  28,608  15,400  0 
a) Per year 
b) Assuming an average employment duration of the PSA-employees of three months (table 3) 
  Source: Own calculations. 
6  Placement incentives  
Monitoring the activities of PSA involves high transaction costs. To avoid moral hazard 
PSA are obliged to provide regular information to the PES concerning their activities. 
Furthermore, the PES has put in place a system of incentives that is based on the results 
obtained. The objective behind the declining payment structure is to ensure that the PSA 
reintegrate their employees as quick as possible into the regular labour market. The pay-
ment of the placement premium in two instalments should avoid that the new job of the 
PSA-employees is of short duration. The answer to the question, to what extent the 
financial incentives conform to these objectives, depends above all on whether the em-
ployees leaving the programme can be replaced quickly. If it is not possible to refill 
vacancies immediately, then the PSA will have no interest on rapid placement. The rea-
son for this is that a PSA can also make profits on its assignment activity.  
If the provider succeeds in filling a vacancy in a short time, then it will be able to fill a 
post several times during the term of the contract. Successful PSA thus have the possi-
bility of repeatedly obtaining a placement premium. Since the base subsidy is also de-
clining, a period of employment of three months always results in the maximum subsidy 





















Figure 5: Total and marginal subsidy per PSA vacancy
employment duration in months
total subsidy factor
Source: Own calculations.







The incentive structure is shown in figure 5. The employment duration of a PSA-em-
ployee is depicted on the abscissa. The corresponding subsidy factor, expressed as a 
multiple of the offer price, the marginal subsidy factor as well as the marginal costs are 
shown on the ordinates. For the sake of simplicity we assume that each PSA-employee 
is successfully placed, that vacancies can be refilled immediately and that the PSA con-
tract is open-ended. Figure 5 shows that the amount of the subsidy per PSA vacancy 
varies directly with the number of placements and increases with shorter employment 
duration. For an employment period of six months, the total subsidy comes to 13.5 
times the offer price for an entire year. If the duration of employment is three months, 
the subsidy comes to 20 times the offer price; a duration of one month results in a total 
subsidy factor of 36. Given an average offer price of 1,100 €, the PSA can count on 
revenue of between 14,850 and 39,600 €. 
The dark line in figure 5 marks the marginal subsidy. The marginal return to rapid 
placement is highest during the first three months. The marginal return decreases with 
increasing employment duration. That the marginal return function is not monotonically 
decreasing follows from the declining discrete payment structure. From the tenth month 
on, the base subsidy is no longer paid, and the placement premium remains constant. 
The marginal return is nevertheless positive, because the PSA can fill the vacancy im-
mediately with a new employee, for whom new subsidies will be paid pro rata. At first 
sight the payment structure represents an incentive for the PSA to place their employees 
as rapidly as possible. It seems that this incentive remains in force even if the PSA is not 
able to place every employee successfully (figure 6). If the placement premium in-
creases in relation to the base subsidy (the premium structure being given), then the 22 
 
incentives for the PSA to place their employees as quickly as possible become stronger. 
But on the other hand, in that case there are fewer resources available to compensate 
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Figure 6: Amount of subsidy as a function of the integration rate









In order to determine the profit maximising employment duration, in addition to the 
marginal return the marginal costs associated with different turnover rates must be taken 
into account. First, the turnover increases if the PSA intensifies its contacts with poten-
tial employers. Second, the PSA can increase the attractiveness of its employees by pro-
viding them with targeted training and coaching. In both cases, the marginal costs of its 
services increase. Increasing turnover rates also lead to increasing hiring costs, since 
hiring a new employee always involves recruiting costs. The PSA will only be inter-
ested in speeding up placement as long as the marginal return is higher than the mar-
ginal costs. Figure 5 assumes a convex marginal cost function. It shows that as a result 
of the declining discrete payment structure, an unique profit maximising employment 
duration does not exist. In February 2005, the average employment duration in a PSA 
was approximately six months. There are two possible interpretations for this result: 
First, the financial incentives are not sufficient to bring about a rapid integration of 
PSA-employees in the labour market; second, the point in time of the placement is not a 
parameter of managerial action (in opposition to the assumption underlying figure 5). 
The low labour demand in Germany and its weak growth support the second interpreta-
tion. 
Table 5 provides a further indication of the low absorption capacity of the labour market 
since the start of the programme. The integration rates are broken down by East and 23 
 
West, in order to take into account the difficult labour market situation in East Ger-
many. As table 5 shows, between June 2003 and February 2005, the average integration 
rate came to 32 percent. But between the Länder of the former Federal Republic and the 
new Länder there are considerable differences. The integration rate in the West was 36 
percent; in East Germany, on the other hand, non-subsidised employment could be 
found for only 25 percent of PSA-employees. Between June 2003 and February 2005, 
direct placement in client firms amounted to 11 percent in the West, in East Germany 
the figure was only 5 percent. The low placement in client firms was, however, com-
pensated by the placement of PSA workers in other firms. 16 percent of exiting employ-
ees found regular employment subject to social insurance contributions in this manner. 
Thus, the PSA tended to function more as professional placement agencies than as 
TWA. Quite a few PSA-employees (8 percent) found work through their own initiative. 
In interpreting these figures, it should be borne in mind that the integration rates pre-
sented in table 5 do not shed any light on the causal treatment effect which is estimated 
in microeconometric evaluations. It is conceivable that the unemployed might have 
found regular (i.e. non-subsidised) employment without the placement efforts made on 
their behalf. Furthermore selection biases will tend to bias downwards the impact of the 
programme. 
Table 5:  Integration rate for PSA-employees 
Exits into employment / all exits June 2003 – February 2005, in % 
  East West  Germany 
Employed, total  24.5 36.2 32.2 
    Client firm  5.1  10.9  8.9 
    Placed by PSA  14.4  16.6  15.8 
    Employee’s own initiative  5.0  8.8  7.5 
Self-employed  0.3 0.4 0.4 
All exits  27,431 53,721 81,152 
        Source: Bundesagentur für Arbeit, own calculations. 
Can the reintegration rates documented in table 5 be considered to represent a success? 
In order to answer this question it is instructive to compare them with the integration 
rates obtained by non-subsidised TWA. The survey carried out in 2000 for the Interna-
tional Association of Temporary Work Agencies showed that 29 percent of German 
TAW were able to find regular employment within a year (CIETT 2000).
4 Rudolf and 
                                                 
4  The transition rate defined in the CIETT study is not comparable methodologically with the definition 
of the integration rate by the PES. It must also be pointed out that only a small number of employees 
were included in the CIETT survey. The survey was conducted in during a period of cyclical upturn, 
which made integration easier.  24 
 
Schröder (1997) estimate an integration rate of 31 percent in the 1980s. Taking into 
consideration the fact that amongst the PSA-employees are probably quite a number 
with one or more impediments to placement, the integration rate of PSA-employees is 
quite respectable. The higher integration rate achieved for PSA-employees as compared 
to employees in TWA indicates that the system of incentives and regulation is having a 
positive effect in helping to get unemployed back into a job. The integration effects 
were, however, higher than those achieved in the pilot projects in the 1990s mentioned 
previously. The PES does not consider the integration rate that has been achieved to be 
satisfactory. When the programme was conceived, an integration rate of 50 percent was 
assumed; this is the reason for the restraint that has been exercised since the middle of 
2004 with respect to putting new contracts up for tender. Integration rates that fall short 
of expectations are also related – as already mentioned – to the insufficient labour de-
mand in Germany. In a recession, enterprises are reluctant to hire new employees. Par-
ticularly in Germany, employers react to fluctuations in demand for their products by 
first taking advantage of the possibilities of internal flexibility such as overtime work 
and working time accounts for their employees. 
7 Conclusions 
Since April 2003 the German PES has used temporary agency work as an instrument of 
active labour market policy. The goal of contracting out is to take advantage of the effi-
ciency gains which arise when enterprises are exposed to competition in quasi-markets. 
The task of the PSA is to find temporary assignments for the unemployed referred to 
their care and ultimately to integrate their employees into non-subsidised employment. 
The PES gives priority to rapid integration. The literature dealing with contracting out 
formulates five conditions that must be fulfilled if quasi-markets are to function effi-
ciently.  
The local employment offices invite publicly tenders for PSA contracts. In this way, an 
ex ante competition for the market is created. The decentralised tendering procedure has 
the advantage of taking into account the local labour market situation and the needs of 
the jobseeker. In order to lower the transaction costs involved in choosing suitable bid-
ders, the tendering procedure comprises three stages. However, the unemployed, who 
are the ultimate users of the services, can not choose between different providers; they 
are referred to providers by the local employment offices. Therefore the ultimate users 
can not influence the price and quality of the service, which is negotiated in advance by 
the employment agency and the PSA. Once a firm has been chosen to receive a contract 
in the tendering procedure, it no longer faces competition for the contract. However, the 
PSA is faced with competition from other TWA with respect to the acquisition of com-25 
 
missions from clients. The PSA can not avoid this competition, since the subsidies only 
partly cover their costs. As strange as it may seem, the insolvencies suffered by many 
PSA document the fact that this market mechanism is indeed working.  
In order to avoid creaming, the process for referring jobseekers to programmes should 
be outside the control of the providers. The empirical evaluation shows, however, that a 
creaming process nevertheless has taken place. It seems to be the case that the PSA have 
succeeded in imposing their personnel preferences on the local employment offices at 
the stage of selecting PSA-employees. The high proportion of dismissed PSA-employ-
ees is another indication that the PSA is engaged in the selection of unemployed. This 
selection is the result of the lack of possibilities for sanctioning such behaviour; apart 
from the possibility of not renewing a contract, the local employment offices have no 
other enforcement procedures. Furthermore, the local employment offices were subject 
to extreme pressure to produce favourable results. Therefore they could scarcely oppose 
the wishes of the PSA. 
Providers ought to be motivated by financial considerations. The purpose of the subsi-
dies provided is to cover a part of the risk. For the PSA are obliged to hire jobseekers 
with impediments to placement, even though there are no commissions from clients. As 
shown in section 5 the amount of coverage depends on the duration of employment. The 
service of the PSA has two dimensions: its quality and quantity. The share of employees 
on assignment and the amount of training provided during periods of non-assignment 
can be taken as measures for the quality of the services provided by a PSA. It is an open 
question whether the subsidies have influenced the quality of the services; the share of 
temporary assignments achieved by the PSA is much lower than the share prevailing 
among traditional TWA. Investigations based on sampling have also shown that some 
PSA do not provide any training. The integration rate is one measure of the quantity of 
the service and is below what was expected. This may be an indication that especially 
the declining base subsidy, which is not directly related to success, is not sufficient to 
promote rapid integration. 
Information asymmetries are often a central theme in the literature on contracting out. 
To avoid problems with respect to lack of information the PES uses in addition to a 
monitoring system an incentive compatible payment system which depends heavily on 
the success of the PSA. The integration rate represents a simple quantification of the 
services provided. The subsidy which decreases with the employment duration in the 
PSA is designed to provide an incentive for the PSA to integrate the unemployed as 
quickly as possible in the regular labour market. In order to prevent short-term place-
ments, the placement premium is paid in two instalments, and the second instalment 26 
 
only falls due when the employee is still employed after six months. In this way, the 
PES receives information on the quality of the placement. Most PSA-employees are 
placed in jobs directly, although this activity is a new field for firms principally engaged 
in the provision of THS. Because of these direct placements the integration rates 
achieved by PSA compared to those of traditional TWA were somewhat higher. Em-
pirical evaluation seems to confirm that especially the placement premiums are a suit-
able instrument for the promotion of rapid integration via direct placements.  
In order to limit transaction costs the PES puts block contracts up for tender. By defin-
ing the target groups in the contract, negotiations concerning the jobseekers referred to 
the PSA can be avoided. But since the PSA can refuse jobseekers that have been se-
lected by the PES, high transaction costs nevertheless arise when the process of desig-
nating PSA-employees goes into a second or third round.  
Although most of the conditions for a functioning quasi-market are fulfilled, neverthe-
less the PSA were subject to vehement criticism from the outset. The PSA were consid-
ered as the core idea of the Hartz proposals and as such they stood under great pressure 
to produce favourable results. The programme was introduced during a period when the 
market for TAW was stagnating or even in slight decline. The insolvency of the largest 
provider caused an enormous image problem. But the continued criticism of the instru-
ment is surprising in the light of the fact that up till now there has been no systematic 
evaluation of the programme. The modification of the conditions of contract after just 
one year does, to be sure, make such an evaluation difficult. In the autumn of 2005 new 
modifications of the institutional setting are to be expected. The tendering procedure 
will be centralised and carried out by the Federal PES. Furthermore, the base subsidy 
will be paid as a flat rate which is much lower than at present and independent of the 
employment duration and the composition of the target group. And finally, the place-
ment premium is to be increased and is to be made the subject of negotiations within the 
tendering procedure. From a theoretical point of view it is doubtful that this reform will 
enhance the efficiency of the programme. Furthermore continual changes in the institu-
tional settings bear the risk of reducing the political acceptance of what was at its incep-
tion a good idea.  27 
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